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“They Think We Are a Threat to Their Culture”: 
Meta-Cultural Threat Fuels Willingness and Endorsement
of Extremist Violence against the Cultural Outgroup
Milan Obaidi, Department of Psychology, Uppsala and Yale University
Lotte Thomsen, Department of Psychology, University of Oslo and Aarhus University
Robin Bergh, Department of Psychology, Uppsala and Harvard University
Far-right political parties in Europe regularly portray Muslims and Islam as backward and a symbolic threat to secular and/or
Christian European culture. Similarly, Islamist groups regularly portray Westerners and Western culture as decadent and a sym-
bolic threat to Islam. Here, we present experimental evidence that meta-cultural threat – information that members of an out-
group perceive one’s own culture as a symbolic threat to their culture – increases intention and endorsement of political vio-
lence against that outgroup. We tested this in three experimental studies among Muslims and non-Muslims in Scandinavia. In
Studies 1 and 2, we experimentally manipulated whether the dominant majority group was portrayed as seeing Muslim culture
and lifestyle as backward and incompatible with their own culture. These portrayals increased the endorsement of extremist vi -
olence against the West and violent behavioural intentions among Muslims living in Denmark and Sweden. Study 3 used a sim-
ilar paradigm among non-Muslim Danes and demonstrated that learning about Muslims portraying the non-Muslim Danish in -
group as a threat increased endorsement of ethnic persecution of Muslims, conceptually replicating the general effect that
meta-cultural threat fuels endorsement of extremist violence among both majority and minority groups.
Keywords: extremism, political violence, ethnic persecution, meta-cultural threat perception, right-wing and Islamist extremism
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“The Muslim way of life is incompatible with Danish Christian
thinking. It  is  contrary  to  Danish thinking to  accept extreme
male  chauvinism,  corporal  punishment,  gender  segregation,
forced marriages, female genital mutilation, beating and brain-
washing of school children – not to mention: [our] educated,
proper and civilized behavior towards each other.” 
Pia Kjærsgaard (1998), Speaker of the Danish parliament
and the former leader of the Danish People’s Party, trans-
lated from Danish. 
“It is the case of a people who have reached the peak of growth
and elevation in the world of science and productivity, while re-
maining abysmally primitive in the world of the senses, feelings,
and behavior. A people who have not exceeded the most prim-
ordial levels of existence, and indeed, remain far below them in
certain areas of feelings and behavior.” 
Sayed Qutb (1951), leading member of the Egyptian Muslim
brotherhood and one of the key scholars behind the Islamist
ideology.
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Events in the past two decades have sparked renewed inter-
est  in  the  so-called  “clash  of  civilizations”  (Huntington
1993). One could characterize conflict between Western and
Muslim-majority countries through a narrative that appears
to  support  Huntington’s  prediction  that  cultural  identity
would be the primary source of conflict after the Cold War.
Evidence for this would include the Western-led wars in Mus-
lim-majority countries, the expansion of “homegrown” Islamic
terrorism in the West, the controversy surrounding the publi-
cation of caricatures of the prophet Muhammed, and most
recently  the  war  against  ISIS.  Far-right  politicians  (see
Mackey  2015;  Bienkov  2015)  and  commentators  (Carr
2006;  Fallaci  2002;  Houellebecq 2015;  Murray  2017)  in
Europe  have  fueled  the  perception  of  incompatibility  and
conflicting values between a Muslim and a Western world,
without any acknowledgment of how their zeal may contrib-
ute  to such strife, as they portray  Muslims as a symbolic
threat to European cultural values including Christianity, sec-
ularism,  and  liberalism  (see  also  Kumar  2012;  Saeed
2007). 
In a similar fashion, Islamists regularly portray Western cul-
ture as a threat to Islam and Muslims (CNN 2003; Wage-
makers 2008). They and some other Muslims, too, describe
a clash  between  civilizations, and  view  Western  principles
and values as threatening and fundamentally different from
their own (Gallup Poll 2002a; Gallup Poll 2002b; Pew Re-
search Centre 2006). In this radical Islamist rhetoric, West-
erners are portrayed as immoral and adhering to values in-
herently incompatible with and inferior to Islamic culture and
traditions. Muslims and Westerners appear well aware that
each group sees the other as a symbolic threat. These social
perceptions are highly salient among both groups (Guardian
2005; Hervik 2004; Kunst, Sam, and Ulleberg 2013; Kunst
et al. 2012; Poole 2002; Wagemakers 2008). 
Religious and cultural values may function as coordinated
systems that enforce collaboration by sanctioning norm vio-
lators. Cultures may spread or become extinct through cul-
tural conversion where people tend to selectively immigrate
and assimilate  into  more successful  cultures, and the  ar-
chaeological and linguistic record suggests a long history of
this occurring (for a review, see Henrich 2015). Given such
dynamics, it is perhaps not surprising to find that people are
attuned to threats to their own culture, as well as how others
perceive it (which could also provide clues about potential
conflicts). Much prior work has documented the effect of cul-
tural, symbolic outgroup threat – seeing certain groups as a
threat to one’s own culture – on outgroup negativity (Stephan
and Stephan 2000). Indeed, recent correlational and meta-
analytic evidence suggests that symbolic threats might rally
support for outgroup violence to a greater extent than realis-
tic threats to the concrete economic survival and safety of
the  ingroup (Obaidi, Kunst, et  al. 2018, see  also  Obaidi,
Bergh, et al 2018). 
It is possible that the very perception that another group
sees one’s own group as a threat to their culture will in itself
mobilize people to defend their own culture, with violence if
need be. Here, we provide an initial  test  of  whether  such
meta-cultural threats fuels intention and endorsement of ex-
tremist violence. In particular, we propose that the belief that
the other group sees one’s own culture as a symbolic threat
increases endorsement of outgroup violence among Muslim
and non-Muslim Westerners alike. Numerous studies  show
the aversive effect of meta-perceptions on intergroup interac-
tion, documenting that holding a meta-stereotype may have
a more significant and profound impact on intergroup rela-
tions than the “first hand” stereotypes that group members
have about outgroups (Richeson and Shelton 2007; Vorauer
et al. 2000; see also MacInnis and Hodson 2012; Vorauer
and Kumhyr 2001).
1. (First-Hand) Symbolic Threats and Intergroup Hostility 
Integrated  threat  theory  (Stephan  and  Stephan,  1993,
1996a, 1996b) shows that symbolic threat perceptions (for
example, first-hand threat: “they are threatening”) have the
potential to lead to outgroup hostility and aggression (Esses,
Haddock, and  Zanna  1993;  Esses,  Hodson,  and  Dovidio
2003; McLaren 2003). Another line of research shows that
when groups perceive each other’s norms, values and reli-
gion as backward and inferior they are also more likely to ex-
press hostility toward the other group (Alexander, Levin, and
Henry 2005; Brandt et al. 2014; Henry and Reyna 2007;
Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis 2005; Tetlock 2003). 
Individuals who perceive threats to their cherished values
may also come to feel less “significant,” leading them to en-
dorse and engage in violence in order to restore their psy-
chological  sense  of  significance  (Kruglanski  et  al. 2009).
Similarly,  Moghaddam  (2006)  suggested  that  intergroup
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conflicts that are related to, and may threaten, a group’s reli-
gion, and cherished values are crucial drivers of suicide ter-
rorism. Other empirical work also supports the link between
symbolic  threat  and  endorsement  of  violence  (Bueno  de
Mesquita 2007; Doosje, Loseman, and van den Bos 2013;
Doosje et al. 2012; Fair and Shepherd 2006; Ginges and
Atran  2009;  van  Bergen  et  al.  2015).  Indeed,  symbolic
threat is associated with intention and support for outgroup
violence across cultures, regardless of group status (for ex-
ample  majority/minority),  over  and  above  any  “realistic”
threats pertaining to economical security and physical safety
(Obaidi, Kunst, et al. 2018).
2. Meta-Perceptions and Intergroup Relations
Previous research on perceived symbolic threat and endorse-
ment  of  violence  has  generally  focused  on  individuals’ or
groups’ negative judgments of outgroup members (“I believe
they threaten our culture …”). Here, we ask whether meta-
perceptions of symbolic threat (“I believe they think that we
threaten their culture …”) fuel outgroup violence. Because we
see ourselves through the eyes of others, people are deeply
interested  in  how  others  view  them (Cooley  1902;  Mead
1934; Berger and Luckmann 1966). In particular, given the
crucial role of cultural group living and the rules and values
that  have  sustained  it  throughout  human history  (Henrich
2015), people should be expected to react negatively when
they  perceive someone  to  be threatening  their  culture, as
amply demonstrated by the research reviewed in the previ-
ous section. Hence, people should intuitively infer that any-
one perceiving them and their culture to be a cultural threat
will be particularly hostile towards them, which should in turn
fuel their  own willingness to resort to outgroup violence in
the face of such inferred uncompromising hostility. The cur-
rent studies present our first empirical tests of this general
prediction. 
Vorauer, Main, and O’Connell (1998, 917) refer to the term
meta-stereotype as “a person’s beliefs regarding the stereo-
type  that  outgroup  members  hold  about  his  or  her  own
group.” In principle, of course, meta-perception can be posi-
tive, neutral or negative, but researchers usually use the term
meta-perceptions to refer to negative beliefs that one group
may harbour against another (Frey and Tropp 2006; Vorauer
et al 2000).
Previous research confirms that when people expect or be-
come aware that outgroup members hold negative stereo-
types about their group, it negatively influences their inter-
group interaction. Vorauer et al. (1998) demonstrated that
the more the majority population (for example white Ameri-
cans) expected to be stereotyped by the minority population,
the  less  they  desired  to  interact  with  the  minority  group
members, and the more prejudice they held towards the mi-
nority group members. Similarly, when ethnic minorities ex-
pected that the majority group would view them with preju-
dice, they (the ethnic minorities) had more negative experi-
ences  during  interethnic  interactions  with  majority  group
members (Shelton, Richerson and Salvatore 2005), and ex-
pressed less  interest  in  interacting  with  them (Finchilescu
2010; Owuamalam and Zagefka 2011; see also Frey  and
Tropp 2006; Plant 2004).
Anticipating  negative  evaluation from outgroup  members
can also lead to hostile and negative acts directed towards
the  outgroup  by  reciprocation  of  the  negative  evaluation
(Bourhis  et  al.  1979;  Devine,  Evett,  and  Vasquez-Suson
1996;  Kamans  et  al  2009;  Kteily, Hodson, and  Bruneau
2016; O’Brien Leidner and Tropp 2017). For instance, Dutch
Moroccan teenagers who felt negative about the Dutch and
believed that the autochthonous Dutch held negative stereo-
types about them as criminal and aggressive were more in-
clined to act in line with this negative image by endorsing ag-
gressive behavior toward the Dutch society (Kamans et al.
2009; see also Owuamalamet al. 2013). Kteily et al. (2016)
showed that meta-dehumanization (“I believe that they think
that we are less than human”) leads both Westerners and
Arabs  to  (first-hand)  dehumanize  the other  group, in  turn
leading  to  support  for  violence against  the  outgroup (see
also Doosje and Haslam 2005). 
In  sum, there  is  a  robust  evidence  for  negative  conse-
quences of  meta-perceptions (Barlow, Sibley, and Hornsey
2012; Bourhis et al. 1979; Finchilescu 2010; O’Brien et al.
2017; Richeson and Shelton 2007; see also MacInnis and
Hodson,  2012;  Owuamalam  et  al.  2013;  Vorauer  et  al.
1998; Vorauer and Kumhyr 2001), although few studies have
investigated the effects of negative meta-cultural perceptions
on actual endorsement of extremist intergroup violence (but
see Kamans et al. 2009; Kteily et al. 2016). Prior research
has (to the best of our knowledge) focused largely on meta-
perceptions of personal and/or “essentialist” attributes (for
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example that  the outgroup sees one as stupid, savage, or
less than human) and intergroup violence. But given the im-
portance of culture for human group-living, people can be
expected to be attuned to perceptions of their culture and its
values. Here we present a series of initial experiments that
test  whether  people  respond  with  greater  endorsement  of
outgroup violence when they  learn  that  an outgroup sees
their ingroup’s culture and values as threatening, incompati-
ble,  and  inferior  to  its  own  culture.  This  paper  attempts
specifically to advance that knowledge in relation to the in-
creasingly hostile relations between Westerners and Muslims.
In these initial studies, we chose to focus on perceptions
of  both  cultural  threat,  incompatibility  and  inferiority  or
“backwardness”, because the negative effects of a perceived
symbolic threat likely presuppose that the outgroup culture is
also seen as incompatible and worse than the ingroup’s cul-
ture: If not, groups might simply develop their culture by inte-
grating new cultural aspects from the outgroup, as happens
when  cultural  practices  spread  without  this  being  experi-
enced  as  a  cultural  threat  (for  example  the  widespread
adaption of American traditions of Valentine’s Day and Hal-
loween  in  Scandinavia  in  recent  years).  Indeed,  cultural
threat, beliefs about incompatibility and inferiority or “back-
wardness” constitute the attitudinal bases of contemporary
anti-Western (see Pew Research Centre 2006) and anti-Mus-
lim  resentment  among  Muslims  and  secular  or  Christian
Westerners respectively (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007).
Previous studies have also shown that portraying outgroup
members as inferior, incompatible and threatening can lead
to rejection and hostility in the form of opposition to civil lib-
erties for the targeted group (Dunn 2001). 
As illustrated in the quotes presented at the beginning of
this  paper, Islamists  and  right-wing  autochthonous  politi-
cians,  including  right-wing  extremists  and  commentators,
share a common strategy:  both groups claim that  the re-
spective outgroup is a cultural threat and inferior to the in-
group (Murray 2017; see also Mackey 2015; Bienkov 2015).
Here, we test whether symbolic threat from knowledge that
an outgroup perceives a subject’s cultural ingroup as “back-
ward” and incompatible can increase willingness to partici-
pate in violence against the outgroup. We assess this by ex-
posing Danish and Swedish Muslims (Studies 1 and 2) and
secular/Christian Danes (Study 3) to information suggesting
that the outgroup views their (the participants’) cultural in-
group as inferior and as a cultural threat; we test whether ex-
posure to this information increases behavioral intentions to
participate in outgroup extremist violence and increases sup-
port for ethnic persecution against the outgroup. 
3. Aims and Overview 
For the three studies, we hypothesize that learning that a cul-
tural  outgroup perceives  a  subject’s  cultural  ingroup as a
symbolic threat increases the subject’s endorsement of vio-
lence against the outgroup, and that this happens in similar
ways among non-Muslim and Muslim Westerners in relation
to each other. Study 1 experimentally manipulated whether
Danish  Muslims  were  told  that  autochthonous  Danes  see
their group’s culture and religion as “backward,” “incompati-
ble,” and a threat to their way of life, testing the hypothesis
that  such  information  would  increase  endorsement  of  ex-
tremist violence against Europe in defense of Muslims and/
or Islam. Study 2 conceptually replicated this paradigm in
Sweden, testing whether such meta-perceptions of cultural
threat would also cause actual behavioral intentions to en-
gage in political violence in defense of Islam and/or Muslims
(as opposed to “solely” supporting the violence of others).
Study 3 matched the paradigm as closely as possible with a
sample from the Danish majority population to test the pre-
diction that Muslim citizens in Denmark perceiving Danish
culture as “incompatible,” “inferior,” and a cultural threat to
Islam would also increase their (non-Muslim Danes’) inten-
tions to participate in ethnic persecution of Muslims.
4. Study 1: Danish Muslims
Study 1 manipulated the perception among Danish Muslims
that the majority of non-Muslim Danes see Islamic culture
and lifestyle as incompatible and inferior, and assessed ef-
fects of this meta-perception on endorsement of extremist vi-
olence against the West. 
The Danish context is of particular interest for several rea-
sons, all  of  which  suggest  that  Muslims might  experience
high  levels  of  meta-cultural  threat  perception. Specifically,
Denmark was the origin of the controversy surrounding publi-
cation  of  cartoons  depicting  the  prophet  Muhammad, as
they were first published in the Danish Jyllands Posten. Sec-
ond, the  rise  and success  of  the  anti-immigration  Danish
People’s Party has resulted in Denmark adopting restrictive
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immigration and asylum policies. Most importantly, after Bel-
gium, Denmark has been the European country  producing
the  most  “homegrown” Muslim  foreign  fighters  per  capita
since 2012 (Neumann 2015).
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants and Procedures
We first  identified eighty  Facebook groups in Denmark re-
lated to Islam and Muslims. From this initial pool we ran-
domly selected twenty groups to recruit participants from. We
sampled 154 respondents (63.8 percent female). Since our
study involved Muslims’ endorsement of extremist violence,
two respondents who did not identify themselves as Muslims
were excluded from further analysis. This resulted in a reli-
giously homogenous sample of 152 participants. 
The majority  of  the participants  were in  the  18–34 age
range (84.3 percent). In terms of education, 11.2 percent
were  enrolled  in  high  school, 9.5 percent  had completed
high school, 27.2 percent were enrolled in university, 22.5
percent  had a bachelor’s  degree and 23.2 percent  had a
post-graduate degree. In terms of social class 2.6 percent
identified  as  upper  class, 15.2  percent  as  upper  middle
class, 63.6 percent as middle class, 15.9 percent as lower
middle class and 2.6 percent as working class. Participants
received no personal compensation for participation, but we
paid 20 DKK (approximately $4) to a charitable cause cho-
sen by each participant. 
4.2. Measures and Materials. 
An overview of  the measures and their  items used in the
three studies can be found in the supplementary online ma-
terials (SOM).
4.2.1. Experimental Manipulation. 
A half of the participants, selected randomly, were presented
with the following information about meta-cultural threat and
incompatibility  and inferiority/backwardness, based on ac-
tual statements by Danish politicians and members of the
public: 
“The following section is a summary of the most recent poll
concerning ethnic Danes’ attitudes towards Muslim immigrants
in Denmark. Please read the summary and answer the following
questions.
The majority of native Danes see the presence of Muslim im-
migrants in Denmark as a problem, and they see Islamic cul-
ture and religion as backward. They see Islamic values, norms
and traditions as incompatible with Danish values, norms, and
traditions. Because of this, native Danes believe that  Muslim
immigrants pose a threat to Denmark. Furthermore, the study
shows that Danes do not think that Muslims belong to Danish
society.”
The other half of participants in the control condition were
presented with a fictional summary of “television watching
habits” among  Danes  that  was  matched  in  length  to  the
meta-cultural threat condition. Both manipulations were fol-
lowed by a filler task in which participants rated their prefer-
ence for a series of graphical icons. Upon completion of the
questionnaire, participants were debriefed as to the actual
goal of the study and thanked for their participation.
4.2.2. Dependent Variable
After the experimental manipulation and filler task, partici-
pants completed the measure of endorsement of violent ex-
tremism, measured with six items (for example, “Those who
harm Muslims  should  be  exposed  to  same  treatment,” α
= .73) rated from 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree, ex-
cept for the last two items which were rated from 1 do not
support to 7 strongly support.1
4.3. Results and Preliminary Discussion
A one-way ANOVA showed that, as predicted, the perceived
meta-cultural threat condition had a significant effect on en-
dorsement  of  violent  extremism  (F(1,  150)  =  12.52,
2 ,= .08, p < .001, see Figure 1), such that participants inη
the meta-threat condition expressed greater support for anti-
Western  violence  (M =  2.72, SD =  1.37, 95% CI  [2.46,
2.99]) than participants in the control condition (M = 2.04,
SD  =  0.98, 95% CI  [1.77, 2.31]). We also  performed  a
Bayesian independent-samples t-test in JASP to test the pre-
diction  that  endorsement  of  extremist  violence  would  be
1 Given the difficulty in reaching our samples, Studies 1 and 2 col-
lected a broad spectrum of data designed to address a range of re-
search questions. Variables not included in the studies reported 
here concerned, for example ethnic/Danish/Muslim identification, 
altruism, group and personal relative deprivation, social dominance 
orientation, religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, 
perceived Islamophobia, and injustice, dehumanization, and per-
ceived personal uncertainty. For Studies 1 and 2 we ran a series of 
moderation analyses for a set of variables relevant to Islamist ex-
tremism and did not find any significant moderations (perceived 
personal deprivation;  = .39, p = .700, perceived Islamophobia; β β
= .40, p = .693; perceived injustice;  = -.59 p = .556, and SDO; β β
= .07 p = .496).
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greater in the meta-cultural threat condition than in the con-
trol condition, with a default prior of a 50 percent likelihood
that the effect size would fall between -.707 and .707 (see
Bartlett 2017). This analysis showed a BF10 Bayes factor of
47.61, indicating strong evidence in favor of the experimen-
tal hypothesis, relative to the null hypothesis.
The results of Study 1 confirmed our hypothesis that learn-
ing  about  negative  meta-cultural  threat  perceptions  about
one’s group fuels greater endorsement of extremist violence
against the outgroup. In other words Study 1 showed that
telling Muslim participants that their values were seen as a
“backward” and incompatible threat to Danish culture by au-
tochthonous Danes (manipulated meta-symbolic threat per-
ception) increased their endorsement of extremist violence. 
5. Study 2: Swedish Muslims
In  Study  2, we  replicated  Study  1  in  a  different  context,
among Muslim residents of Sweden, and used a more strin-
gent measure of violence. Whereas Study 1 assessed atti-
tudes towards endorsement of violent extremism, this study
focused on actual behavioral intentions to commit violence
in defense of Muslims or/and Islam. Behavioral  intentions
tend to be better predictors of actual behavior than attitudi-
nal  support  (see  de  Weerd  and  Klandermans  1999). The
measure  of  violent  behavioral  intentions  used  here  has
proven able to differentiate actual jihadists from the general
population  in  Afghanistan  (Obaidi  et  al,  forthcoming;  see
also Obaidi, Kunst, et al. 2018). In other words, the depen-
dent measure here should be more proximate to actual vio-
lence by Muslims against Westerners. 
Like Denmark, Sweden has seen a recent rise in right-wing
rhetoric and political representation, and has witnessed in-
creases  in  anti-Muslim  and  anti-immigration  rhetoric  and
hate crimes against Muslims across several Swedish cities
(Reuter 2015). In terms of per capita figures for foreign fight-
ers traveling to Syria and Iraq, Sweden is third on the list of
European countries (Neumann 2015). These developments
make Sweden an ideal context to test our predictions.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants and Procedures
We used data collection procedures similar to those used in
Study 1. From a pool of ten Islam-related Facebook groups
in Sweden, we sampled 151 Muslim respondents (57.4 per-
cent women). The majority of the participants were in the 18–
34 age range (86.0 percent). In terms of education, 26.1
percent had completed high school, 46.3 percent were en-
rolled in university, 15.7 percent had earned a university de-
gree and 4.5 percent had a post-graduate degree. In terms
of  social  class, 0.7 percent  identified as upper class, 9.7
Figure 1: Mean ratings and standard errors of meta-cultural threat and control conditions for
Studies 1, 2, and 3.
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percent  as  upper  middle  class,  58.2  percent  as  middle
class, 14.2 percent as lower middle class and 17.2 percent
as working class. Participants received no personal compen-
sation, but we paid 20 SEK (approximately $4) to a charita-
ble cause chosen by each participant. 
5.2. Measures and Materials
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two exper-
imental conditions from Study 1 (with minor adjustments for
the Swedish context). 2
5.2.1. Dependent Variable
After the experimental manipulation, participants completed
a six-item scale (  = .86: Obaidi  et  al., forthcoming; seeα
also Obaidi, Bergh, et al, forthcoming), which measured par-
ticipants’ behavioral intentions to commit violence in defense
of Islam and/or Muslims (for example, “I would personally
use violence against people harming other  Muslims that I
care  about” rated  from  1  strongly  disagree  to  7  strongly
agree). 
5.3. Results and Preliminary Discussion
We again used a one-way ANOVA to test the effect of the
meta-cultural threat manipulation on behavioral intentions to
commit violence. The analysis showed that the overall effect
of the meta-cultural threat manipulation was significant (F
(1, 83) = 8.370, 2 = .09, p < .01). Participants in  theη
meta-cultural threat condition expressed stronger behavioral
intentions to  commit  violence in  defense of  Islam and/or
Muslims (M = 3.28, SD = 1.59, 95% CI [2.82, 3.73]) com-
pared to those in the control  condition (M = 2.31, SD =
1.49, 95% CI  [1.86, .2.76]), see  Figure  1. We also  per-
formed a Bayesian independent-samples t-test, as in Study
1. The BF10 Bayes factor was 7.97, again indicating strong
evidence for the experimental hypothesis. Thus, in line with
the results of Study 1, the perception that autochthonous,
non-Muslim Swedes view Muslim culture as a backward and
incompatible threat to Swedish culture caused a significant
2 The current study included another experimental manipulation 
(perceived realistic threat), which was not related to our dependent 
variables. Post hoc analyses using the Scheffé test indicated that 
the only significant difference was between the meta-cultural threat 
perception and the control conditions (p =.01).
increase in Swedish Muslims’ behavioral intention to employ
violence in defense of Islam and/or Muslims.
6. Study 3: Non-Muslim Danes
Studies  1  and  2  among  Danish  and  Swedish  Muslims
demonstrated that  meta-cultural  threat  increased endorse-
ment of extremist violence (Study 1) and violent behavioral
intentions  to  defend  Islam  and/or  Muslims  (Study  2). In
Study  3, we  tested  whether  these  effects  would  replicate
among the majority group in Denmark. Here, we experimen-
tally  manipulated  meta-cultural  threat  among  non-Muslim
Danes telling them that the majority of Muslim citizens view
Danish culture as incompatible, inferior and a threat to Is-
lamic culture. We predicted that exposure to this meta-threat
would increase willingness to participate in ethno-religious
persecution of Muslims. In other words, our overall prediction
is that non-Muslim and Muslim Danes react the same way in
relation to each other, namely with an endorsement of vio-
lence, when meta-perceptions of symbolic cultural threat are
made salient.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants and Procedures
Study 3 was also an online study with the same data collec-
tion procedure as Studies 1 and 2. We collected data from
191 non-Muslim Danes (M age = 28.57, SD = 8.82; 55.8%
women)  from  different  Facebook  groups  in  Denmark.  In
terms  of  education,  25.1  percent  had  completed  high
school, 40.8 percent had earned a bachelor’s degree, 8.5
percent  had  attended  master’s  studies  and  18.3  percent
had a post-graduate degree. In terms of  social  class, 4.7
percent  identified  as  upper  class, 17.4  percent  as  upper
middle class, 65.1 percent as middle class, 11.6 percent as
lower middle class and 1.2 percent as working class. Partici-
pants received a gift card worth 60 DKK (approximately $10)
for an online take-away service.
6.2. Measures and Materials
6.2.1. Experimental Manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two exper-
imental  conditions  from  the  previous  studies:  half  were
primed with the information about meta-cultural threat and
incompatibility adapted from Studies 1 and 2; the other half
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formed the control group. The following text was presented to
the meta-threat group:
“The following section is a summary of the most recent poll
concerning Muslim immigrants’ attitudes towards native Danes
in Denmark. Please read the summary and answer the following
questions.
The majority of Muslim immigrants see native Danes as a prob-
lem, and they see Danish culture and religion as morally cor-
rupt. They see Danish values, norms and traditions as incom-
patible with the Islamic values, norms and traditions. Because
of this, Muslim immigrants believe that  native Danes pose a
threat to their culture in Denmark. Furthermore, the study shows
that many Muslim immigrants prefer not to assimilate into Dan-
ish society.”
In the control condition, participants were again presented
with the text describing preferences for various TV programs.
6.2.2. Dependent Variable
Next, we measured Muslim outgroup persecution, which was
adapted from Altemeyer’s (1996) posse measure, following
Thomsen et al. (2008). Participants were asked to “imagine
that someday in the future the Danish government decides to
outlaw immigrant organizations and requests all citizens to
do their best to make sure that the law has a successful ef-
fect.” Participants then indicated on a scale from 1 strongly
disagree  to  7  strongly  agree  how much  they  agreed  with
items about Muslim persecution: (for example “I would par-
ticipate in attacks on Muslim headquarters if supervised by
the proper authorities”,  = .95).α
6.3. Results 
As in Studies 1 and 2, we used a one-way ANOVA to test the
effect of the meta-cultural threat manipulation on intention-
ality  towards  violent  persecution  of  Muslims. The  analysis
showed that the overall effect of the meta-cultural threat ma-
nipulation  was  significant  (F  (1,191)  =  24, 2  =  .11, pη
< .001, see Figure 1). Participants in the meta-threat condi-
tion  expressed  stronger  willingness  to  violently  persecute
Muslims (M = 1.80, SD = 1.19, 95% CI [1.6, 2.04]) com-
pared to those in the control condition (M = 1.17, SD = .41,
95% CI [1.08, .1.25]). As in the previous studies, we per-
formed a Bayesian independent-samples t-test, which pro-
vided strong evidence for the experimental hypothesis (BF10
Bayes factor = 7437.18). Thus, in this dataset of non-Muslim
Danes we conceptually replicated the results of Studies 1
and 2, demonstrating that similar processes underlie nega-
tive outgroup attitudes and intentions in response to meta-
cultural threat perceptions, irrespective of whether a person
belongs to the dominant or the subordinate group.
7. General Discussion
Identifying how Muslim and non-Muslim Westerners respond
to meta-cultural threat perceptions is important for practical
application  and  theory  development. The  relationship  be-
tween Muslim culture and the West is often described as one
of the most pressing socio-political challenges of our time
(Barrett 2017; Huntington 1993). More knowledge about the
psychological mechanisms that underlie tension between the
groups is urgently needed to address violence by both right-
wing and Islamist extremists. 
In the present work, we provide initial evidence that Mus-
lims’ and non-Muslims’ meta-cultural threat perceptions have
direct consequences on their attitudes and behavioral inten-
tions towards each other. Three experimental studies demon-
strated detrimental effects of meta-cultural threat on inter-
group relations, with increased levels of endorsement of and
willingness to engage in political violence. Effects replicated
across  contexts  and group status  (majority/minority), sug-
gesting  similar  underlying  mechanisms.  Our  findings  lend
support to the theoretical account of extremism that argues
that one group’s hostility triggers an extreme response in a
second group that further radicalizes the first group (Eatwell
2006;  Moghaddam  2018, see  also  Reicher  and  Haslam
2016).
Previous  research demonstrated  that  first-hand  symbolic
threat  among Muslim  and non-Muslim populations  across
seven  WEIRD  (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and
democratic) and non-WEIRD cultures is a more potent and
stronger  predictor  of  outgroup  aggression  than  realistic
threats  to ingroup’s  safety  and economic  survival  (Obaidi,
Kunst, et al. 2018). Just as first-hand symbolic threat oper-
ates  similarly  among  Muslim  and  non-Muslim  Europeans,
these findings show that meta-perceptions of cultural incom-
patibility can also fuel willingness and endorsement of ex-
tremist violence for both groups. 
Throughout these initial studies on meta-cultural threats,
we manipulated  cultural  threat, incompatibility, “backward-
ness,” and inferiority together. We believe this follows the ba-
sic logic of cultural threat, as the main attitudinal compo-
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nents of anti-Western and anti-Muslim resentment (Research
Centre  2006;  Dunn  et  al.  2007)  and  contemporary  dis-
course about how Muslims and non-Muslims perceive each
other. These dimensions are also central components of the
contemporary prejudice expressed by both groups towards
each other. For example, some non-Muslim Westerners per-
ceive Muslim men as a threat to white women, perceiving
Muslim men as unable to control their  “aggressive” sexual
tendencies  or  sexist  attitudes  (Murray  2017). The  current
U.S.  president  justified  his  “Muslim  ban”  partly  on  the
grounds that Muslim immigrants posed a threat to women in
the United States (Taub 2016). This perception of threat from
Muslim men implies that their behaviour is incompatible with
Western, liberal values of respecting women: Muslim men are
portrayed as backward and less civilized on the basis of be-
ing  unable  to  control  their  “aggressive” sexual  tendencies
(Hubbard 2005). Although meta-perceptions of a culture as
“backward” and symbolically threatening are often likely to
go hand-in-hand, future research should test whether they
have distinct consequences that differ in severity. For these
initial experiments of cultural meta-perceptions, we favored
ecologically valid manipulations over precise examination of
specific factors. 
Across the three studies we used different dependent vari-
ables, which can be seen both as a strength and a weak-
ness. The fact that we found similar effects, although we var-
ied  our  measures  of  violence  across  studies,  is  a  clear
strength of this paper. However, we have less knowledge of
whether we would have found the exact same results if we
had  used  the  exact  same  dependent  variables  across  all
studies. Nevertheless, a recent study using the same depen-
dent variable we used in Study 2 found similar results across
three studies among three different populations and contexts
(Obaidi, Kunst, et al. 2018). Although this suggests that we
might have reached the exact results had we used the exact
same  dependent  variable  across  all  studies,  future  work
should test this empirically.
More generally, these studies contribute experimental evi-
dence to the literature on intergroup threats, the literature on
Muslim extremism, as well as the ways in which research in
psychology can inform the study of security (see O’Brien and
Tropp 2015). In a meta-analysis Riek, Mania, and Gaertner
(2006) commented that one of the major limitations in the
domain of intergroup threat theory is the shortage of experi-
mental studies. The existing empirical studies that have ma-
nipulated  threats have also  shown weaker  effects on out-
group attitudes than those found in correlational studies. This
strongly suggests a need for more experimental studies on
this topic. A similar concern can be raised in the domain of
terrorism research. Although, experiments are widely recog-
nized as important in research on terrorism, they are in fact
rarely  implemented  (Arce,  Croson, and  Eckel  2001). This
problem is  compounded by  the fact  that  this  area  of  re-
search relies heavily on secondary data and is seldom em-
pirical (Silke 2004). To address these limitations, in the cur-
rent study, we used experimental data to examine the effect
of meta-cultural threat perceptions on willingness for and en-
dorsement of extremist violence against the outgroup. 
The results from our controlled experimental manipulations
are important because they can provide insight into how hos-
tile intergroup perceptions and actions serve to confirm and
reinforce each group’s views of its counterpart. Hence, the re-
sults of this initial set of studies provide a new perspective
on how to interpret incidents of political violence in real life.
Developing a theoretical framework to explain these events is
a necessary step toward ultimately finding ways to prevent
them. The current work thus has important implications for
policy-making and de-radicalization processes. For example,
efforts could be implemented to reduce the perception of
meta-cultural threat by promoting belonging and connected-
ness, which has been suggested to be important in prevent-
ing violent extremism (Ellis and Abdi 2017). 
In future work it would be relevant to investigate the under-
lying psychological mechanisms through which meta-cultural
threats increase endorsement of outgroup violence, and to
directly compare any unique effects to other negative per-
ceptions and meta-perceptions of outgroups. For instance, is
the effect of such meta-perceived symbolic threats as strong
as or even stronger than perceived symbolic threats from an
outgroup? Does any frame that implies cultural conflict in-
crease proclivity for outgroup violence and do such percep-
tions mediate the effects of both first-hand and meta-cul-
tural threat? And, importantly, will positive, conciliatory meta-
information  that  the  outgroup  thinks  that  one’s  culture  is
compatible with, as worthy as, and not a threat to their own
culture cause parallel reductions in willingness to engage in
outgroup violence (see O’Brien  et  al. 2017)? Future work
should  also  explore  which  individual  psychological  differ-
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ences moderate the effect  of  meta-cultural  threat  on out-
group violence.
8. Concluding Remarks
We demonstrate that meta-cultural threat perceptions have
detrimental  consequences for  intergroup relations between
Muslim and non-Muslim populations, potentially leading to
acts of violence. We demonstrate that the same conditions
can feed willingness to engage in violent  conflict  between
Muslims  and  non-Muslims  on  both  sides:  meta-cultural
threat fuels the intention for and endorsement of outgroup
violence irrespective of whether the person belongs to the
dominant or minority group. Our results indicate that such
psychological  processes  are  generally  applicable  to  both
Muslims and non-Muslims in predicting intergroup violence
among both low and high power groups. The plausible psy-
chological mechanism for Muslim extremism demonstrated
here also appears to apply to the endorsement of extremist
violence among the Danish majority group. Those who per-
ceive Muslim or Western culture as an inferior, incompatible
cultural  threat, and endorse violence against  it, may have
much in common (in terms of psychological processes) with
the extremists they hate on the other side.
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